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Abstract
The debate on the impact of corporate governance mechanism on earnings management
remains inconclusive. The current paper explored the use of Two Stage Least Square
(2SLS) estimation techniques to examine the relationship between the two constructs
based on data sourced from listed companies on the floor of the Nigerian Stock Ex-
change between 2012 to 2016. We excluded financial industry data based on the pecu-
liarity of the sector’s annual financial reporting system. Our results reveal that at best
the relationship between corporate governance code and earnings management is mixed.
In specific, it shows that governance code exerts negative influence on earnings man-
agement, while a positive relationship was observed to exist between earnings manage-
ment and Insiders ownership. It was also noted that board independence and auditors’
independence has little or no effect on earnings management. The study therefore rec-
ommend that in order to curb earnings management practices, governance code of con-
duct for business entities should be strengthened and compliance should be enforced.
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¿Los mecanismos de gobernanza
corporativa pueden disuadir la gestión 
de las ganancias? 
Evidencia a partir de compañías
incluidas en la Bolsa de Valores 
de Nigeria
Lawal, Adedoyin Isola 
Nwanji, Tony I.
Opeyemi, Oye Olubukoye 
Adama, Ibrahim Joseph 
Resumen
El debate sobre el impacto del mecanismo de gobierno corporativo en la gestión de
los ingresos sigue sin ser concluyente. En este artículo se hace uso de las técnicas de
estimación de mínimos cuadrados de dos etapas para examinar la relación entre ambas
variables a partir de datos de empresas cotizadas en la Bolsa de Valores de Nigeria
entre 2012 y 2016. Se excluyen los datos de la industria financiera debido al peculiar
el sistema anual de información financiera del sector. Los resultados obtenidos revelan
que, en el mejor de los casos, la relación entre el código de gobierno corporativo y la
administración de ingresos es mixta. En concreto, se muestra que el código de gobierno
ejerce una influencia negativa en la gestión de las ganancias, mientras que se observa
una relación positiva entre la gestión de las ganancias y la propiedad de los internos.
También se observa que la independencia del Consejo y la independencia de los audi-
tores tienen poco o ningún impacto en la gestión de las ganancias. Por tanto, este es-
tudio recomienda que, para frenar las prácticas de gestión de ingresos, se fortalezca el
código de conducta de gobierno de las entidades comerciales y se exija su cumpli-
miento.
Palabras clave: 
Gestión de ganancias, gobernanza corporativa, propiedad familiar, Consejo de Di-
rección.
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n 1. Introduction
According to Rath (2008), the primary role of financial statements is to report a com-
pany’s financial information to internal and external users in a timely and reliable man-
ner. Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and
controlled. The main significant function of corporate governance is to increase the in-
tegrity of the financial reporting quality process  (Cohen et al. 2002). The financial re-
porting theme is of great value to all financial statement users in making investment
decision. However, the validity of this objective is being questioned by many users of
corporate financial reports because of the probable effects of earnings management
on information contents of such reports. According to Roman (2009), earnings man-
agement occurs when firm’s management has the opportunity to make accounting de-
cisions that change reported income and exploit those opportunities. Managing
earnings is a deliberate way of taking steps within the control of generally accepted ac-
counting principles to bring about a desired level of reported earnings (Davidson et al.,
1987). Earnings management conceals the true financial result and position of a busi-
ness and makes the facts that stakeholders ought to know unclear. Poor earnings quality
is due to the manipulation of management activities. When preparing financial reports,
managers are free to select the accounting and reporting methods they want to use (Al-
gharaballi, 2013). This has in most cases led to the selection of reporting methods that
could be misleading to the users of such information. The problem with many account-
ing choices that managers make is that there is no clear limit that determines which
choice is legal or not. The act of manipulating the company’s earnings is known as earn-
ings management (Nuryaman, 2013). In cases such as this, the earnings figure may no
longer reflect a true and fair view of the firm’s performance (Whelan and McNamara,
2004). On the process to restore the confidence to the investors, different laws were
puts in place, for example, Sarbanes-Oxley Act Code 2000 in US, corporate governance
code 2011 in Nigeria (Nuraddeen and Hasnah, 2015).
n 2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
The connection between corporate governance and earnings management remain
an issue of hot debate among researchers. While some researchers are of the views
that corporate governance has helped in manipulating earnings management, oth-
ers are of the views that good corporate governance has helped in reducing earnings
management. Some of the contributions to the debate on the link between earnings
management and corporate governance are briefly discussed in this section.
Kasipillai and Mahenthiran (2013) examined factors that attenuates earning man-
agement with focus on deferred taxes and corporate governance ethics for a number
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of public listed companies in the Malaysian economic based on data sourced from
2005 to 2008. The study employed series of simultaneous equation and simulation
model to detect firms that are likely to manipulate or manage earning. The study
observed that Malaysian PLCs uses the accrual and valuation allowance, compo-
nents of net deferred tax liabilities to prevent a downturn in earnings. It is further
noted that ownership structure as well as board structure influences the level of re-
lationship between earning management and deferred tax component (see also
Alonso and De Andres, 2002; Lefort, 2007; Machuga and Teitel, 2009).
Liu et al. (2017) examined the impact of family involvement in ownership, manage-
ment or governance of a business entity so as to know the degree of the impact of
earning management on firms with focus on corporate social responsibility. The
study employed the three –stage least squares (3SLS) full-information approach to
examine the direct impact of family involvement on earning management as it re-
lates directly or indirectly with corporate social responsibility for some selected S&P
500 firms based on data sourced from 2003 to 2010. The study observed that fam-
ily firm engages in less accrual-based earnings management and that they tend to
have higher corporate social responsibility performance useful for maintaining le-
gitimacy and preserve socio-emotional wealth. The study also observed that no sig-
nificant relationship exist between corporate social responsibility and either of
accrual-based or real earnings management behavior for the studied S&P 500 com-
panies after accounting for the effect of family involvement (see also Wang, 2006;
Ali et al., 2007; Bona et al., 2008; Hadani et al., 2011). 
Dai et al. (2017) investigated the impact of block holder’s governance quality on
block holders monitoring outcomes based on data sourced on a number of 892
block acquisitions across 42 economies from 1990 to 2008 within the framework
of governance transfer hypothesis, justification tests and robustness tests. The study
observed that block holder governance transfer is essentially influenced by factors
related to monitoring effectiveness, monitoring cost, and monitoring environment.
The study also noted that the impact of these changes/influences is more pro-
nounced when block acquirers are less engaged in earning management than their
targets especially when the level of proximity and or operation of the block acquires
is in line with that of their targets and the target firms operates with weaker insti-
tutions for investor protection.
For some selected firms across Latin America, Lefort (2005), Matos (2008),  Ruiz
et al. (2009) and Ferreira et al. (2010) observed that institutional investors often
provide corporate governance mechanism that hinders earnings management. They
stressed that the success of the pension reforms in Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Peru
and Mexico which were traceable to the governance role institutional investors sig-
nificantly helped in shaping corporate behavior, protects small or minority share-
holders and deterred managers from embracing earnings management. The authors
stressed that a negative relationship exist between proportions of shares held by in-
stitutional investors and absolute value of discretional accruals.
In a related development, LaFond and Roychowdhury (2006) stressed the impact of
the ability of board of directors in combating earnings management. The author
noted that the Board as delegates of shareholders is empowered to oversee, compen-
sate, reward managers and approve strategic management decisions which will hinder
earnings management. The author however, noted that the structure of the board in
terms of size, composition, degree activeness or regular meetings, independency
among others do affect the link between board behaviour and earnings management
practices (De Andrade et al., 2009; Davila and Watkins, 2009; Santiago and Brown,
2009; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010; Ferraz et al., 2011 and Lorca et al., 2011).
Shan (2015) examined the ability of earnings management to reduce the level of value
relevance. The study further examined whether or not good corporate governance re-
strains earning management by employing hand-collected data from 1012 firms listed
on Shanghai SSE 180 and Shenzhen 100 sourced from 2001 to 2005, using two stages
least squares (2SLT) techniques. The study observed that companies that adopt earn-
ings management strategy have weaker value relevance when compared with companies
that does not engage in earnings management. The study further revealed that compa-
nies with good corporate governance practices are likely to reduce earnings manage-
ment than companies with good corporate governance for the studies economy.
Xue and Hong (2016) examined the impact of corporate governance behavior on ex-
pense stickiness and earning management for a number of Chinese firm using factor
analysis. The study observed that good corporate governance reduces expenses stick-
iness. The study further noted that the interaction between corporate governance and
earnings management further reduces cost stickiness although its impact is weaker
than that on pure effect of earnings management on expense stickiness. 
Riwayati and Siladjaja (2015) examined the impact of corporate governance imple-
mentation on earning management practice for some selected Indonesia companies
based on primary data sourced from 70 respondents. The study used asymmetrical
information variables, structural equation model and two stage least square model
to conduct its analysis. The result shows that though corporate governance essentially
aim at reducing asymmetric information to earning management in practice, corpo-
rate governance policy has little or no impact on earnings management for the In-
donesia companies, rather corporate governance induces earnings management for
the studied economy.
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In a related development, Luthan et al. (2016) examined the effect of differences in
good corporate governance (internal and external) mechanism on earnings man-
agement for the Indonesian economy, with focus on pre and post adoption of In-
donesian financial accounting standards (PSAK) convergence IFRS, for companies
listed on the Indonesian stock exchange based on data sourced from 136 manu-
facturing firms between 2010-2013. The study adopts an explanatory empirical ver-
ification research by employing multiple linear regression method, normality test,
autocorrelation test, heteroscedasticity test, multicolinearity test and observed that
the effect of good corporate governance on earnings management varies on the
mechanism adopted. The study finding is in line with Mulyadi and Anwar (2014)
early findings that good corporate governance influences earnings management
and tax management.
González and García-Meca (2014) stress the impact of fusion of the powers of CEO
and Board Chairman on earnings management. The author noted that good gov-
ernance ethic requires that the two offices should be separated, stressing that, with
high level of concentrated power in one man, chances are that earning management
will be on the increase (see also Ruiz-Porras and Steinwascher, 2007; Chisari and
Ferro, 2009).
De La Rama (2011) calibrated the impact of government index to corporate gov-
ernance- earnings management framework. The author examined the impact of cor-
ruptions relating to ethical issues as well as corporate governance on family-owned
business groups as it relate with earnings management, and observed that control
of corruption, rule of law and effective governance are key in curbing opportunistic
behaviour proxy by earnings management among other things (see also Voliotis,
2011 and Galang, 2011).
Other variables that have gain prominence in examining the impact of corporate
governance mechanism on earnings management includes auditors’ reputation and
competency (Jara and Lopez, 2007); Firm size (Prior, 2008); growth (Francis and
Wang, 2004); Return on Asset (Machuga and Teitel, 2007). For the Spanish econ-
omy, Gras–Gil, Manzano and Fernández (2016) examined the linkages between cor-
porate social responsibility and earnings management by employing multivariate
analysis to analyze panel data set sourced form a sample of some selected Spanish
non-financial companies from 2005 to 2012. The study observed that corporate
social responsibility practices negatively impact on earnings management. It further
stressed that ethical and moral issues pertaining to corporate decision making are
the core of corporate social responsibility, and that engaging in socially responsible
activities enhances stakeholders’ satisfaction, as well as improving corporate repu-
tation of the firm.
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n 3. Hypotheses 
Drawing from the literature,  the  hypotheses  to  be  tested  in  this  study  are  stated
below in their null forms:
H1: There is no significant relationship between the corporate governance mecha-
nisms as define by insider ownership and earnings management practices in
Nigerian quoted companies.
H2: There is no significant relationship between Family ownership concentration
and earnings Management.
H3: There is no significant relationship between Institutional Investors and earnings
Management.
H4: There is no significant relationship between Board of Directors (BOD) inde-
pendence and earnings management practices in Nigerian quoted companies.
H5: There is no significant relationship between audit strength (AUDST) and earn-
ings management practices in Nigerian quoted companies.
H6: There is no significant relationship between firm size (FSZE) and earnings man-
agement practices in Nigerian quoted companies.
H7: There is no significant relationship between political environment or government
influence and earnings management practices in Nigerian quoted companies.
n 4. Data and methods
To achieve the objectives of this study, firms’ annual reports for the period 2008-
2015 were analyzed using the judgmental sampling technique. A total of 18 listed
firms were analyzed from three sectors (consumer goods, natural resources and
agricultural sector). In testing the research hypothesis, the study adopted the use
of both descriptive statistics and econometric analysis using multiple regression for
the listed sampled firms in the estimation of the regression equation under consid-
eration. Discretionary accrual is used as a proxy to determine the extent of earnings
management. Discretionary accruals are obtained by subtracting non-discretionary
accruals from total accruals. The independent variable (corporate governance
mechanism) is represented by board of directors, audit strength and firm size.
4.1. Data 
Data for this study were sourced from the annual reports of companies listed on
the floor of the Nigeria stock market. As it is a common practice in literature on
earnings management, financial institutions are excluded because of their peculiar
accounting system. The data used was sourced from year 2012 to year 2016.
226
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4.2. Earning management metric
Following existing literature, we used discretional accruals as a proxy of earing man-
agement. We employed the modified version of Jones (1995) model to determine the
discretional accruals as stated below:
                             NDAt = α1( 1At–1)+ α2(ΔREVt –ΔRECt)+ α3(PPEt)                          (1)
Where:
ΔREVt  = revennues in year t less revenues in yeart t–1 scaled by total assets t–1
PPEt = gross property plant and equipment in year t scaled by total assets t–1            
A = total assets in t–1
α's = firm specific parameters 
ΔRECt = net receivables in yeart t–1 scaled by total assets t–1                                      
The formula shows that the change in revenues is adjusted for the change in receiv-
ables. This implies that the Modified-Jones model classifies all changes of credit sales
as earnings manipulation by management. The underlying thought is that credit sale
revenues are easier to manipulate through management discretion than sales revenues
based on cash transactions.
4.3. Model specification 
The core objective of this study is to examine the impact of corporate governance frame
work on earnings management as explained by the discretionary accruals, we therefore
regressed the absolute value of the discretionary accruals [abs (DCA)it] on the variables
of ownership structure, Board of Directors, among others as shown below:
         EM =β0+ β1INSOWN + β2FARMOWN + β3INSTINV + β4BIND + β5AUDIND+ 
                         β6FSize + β7GOVT + β8Growth + β9AdROA + ε                            (2)
Where EM is the earnings management, INSOWN represents insider ownership, FARMOWN
represents family ownership concentration, INSTINV represents institutional investors,BIND
represents board independence, AUDIND represents auditors’ independence, FSize repre-
sents firm size which is the natural logarithm of total assets, GOVT represents political and
legal framework, Growth represents the total sale growth rate while the AdROA represents
the industry-adjusted ROA by two-digit SIC code, given that ROA is the return on assets.
A Priors Expectation:
We expect a negative relationship between EM and FSize, EM and GOVT., EM and each
of FARMOWN , BIND, but a positive relationship between EM and each of INSOWN, 
INSTINV, and AUDIND.
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4.4. Research design 
In order to cater for endogeneity issues often experience when examining linkages
between corporate governance and earnings management (Liu et al., 2017) Ebrahim
and Fattah (2015), we employed the use of the two stage least squares (2SLS) full
information technics to examine the impact of corporate governance on earning
management. The model is a shown below:
          AEM =β0+ β1REM + β2INSOWN + β3FARMOWN + β4INSTINV + β5BIND + 
                 β6AUDIND + β7FSize + β8GOVT + β9Growth + β109AdROA + ε              (3)
          REM =β0+ β1AEM + β2INSOWN + β3FARMOWN + β4INSTINV + β5BIND + 
                 β6AUDIND + β7FSize + β8GOVT + β9Growth + β109AdROA + ε              (4)
where 
AEM = Accrual – based earning management measure; 
REM = The real Earning Management; other variables were as stated earlier.
n 5. Empirical results
The results of the descriptive statistics and t-values of discretional accruals are shown
in Tables la and 1a. Table 1a presents the results in aggregated form while Table 1b pre-
sent the results based on sectional analysis. From the results as presented in Table 1b,
all the mean values or discretionary accruals are statistically different from zero. This
implies that evidence abound to show that firms on the floor of the exchange manipu-
late their results either upward shift in profit reporting to imply a better profitability of
the firm or downward shift in profit to beat fiscal requirement of taxation.
l Table 1a. Descriptive statistics table of discretionary accruals estimations
(sectorial analysis) 
Sectors                                            No. of stocks             Mean              Standard deviation                  T                    Adjusted R2
Agriculture                                            5                      0.521                       1.0025                      -0.214                  0.4001
Conglomerates                                     6                     0.5784                      2.3350                       0.325                  0.4021
ICT                                                         9                      0.558                        3.1113                       0.366                  0.4061
Industrial goods                                 17                     0.898                       1.4231                      0.3001                 0.4036
Oil & Gas                                              13                     0.654                       1.8970                     -0.2540                0.4136
Services                                                24                     0.521                        3.2561                       0.211                  0.5440
Consumer goods                                 23                   1.0002                      2.3561                      -0.265                  0.4581
Construction & Real estate                7                     0.7012                      1.0274                       1.211                   0.4550
Healthcare                                           11                    0.8056                      2.0408                      -0.322                 0.4700
Natural resources                               4                    0.9023                     3.01131                      0.221                   0.4552
SOURCE: AUTHORS COMPUTATION 2017
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l Table 1b. Descriptive statistics table of discretionary accruals estimations
(aggregate analysis)
Years                         No. of stocks                    Mean                    Standard deviation                     T                          Adjusted R2
DAC 2012                        119                          0.324                             0.629                          0.619                        0.4512
DAC 2013                        119                          0.378                             0.632                          0.412                        0.4289
DAC 2014                       119                          0.298                             0.442                          0.599                        0.5120
DAC 2015                        119                          0.349                             0.651                          1.365                        0.5033
DAC 2016                       119                          0.337                             0.662                          1.446                        0.5209
SOURCE: AUTHORS COMPUTATION 2017
The sectorial descriptive analysis is presented in Table 1b. From the results, it can
be deduced that our model significantly explains variations in the coefficients of
discretionary accruals, as its explanatory power shows Adjusted R 2 value higher
than 40% for all sectors.
l Table 2. Pearson correlation table
                             AEM                      REM                 INSOWN         FARMOWN       INSTINV             BIND            AUDINV           FSize       GOVT
AEM                      1                                                                                                                                                                        
REM                -0.051**                1                                                                                                                                               
INSOWN          -0.006           0.0056*                1                                                                                                                       
FARMOWN       -0.031            0.0032*          0.0911*               1                                                                                                
INSTINV        -0.0651*         -0.0035*         0.0454*          0.043                1                                                                          
BIND                0.0235          -0.0542*         0.0054*          0.055*         0.0254*              1                                                    
AUDIND           -0.0211           0.0025*          -0.0254          0.0612          0.066          0.0058*            1                                
FSize                 -0.055           0.0640*         -0.0263*         0.0095        -0.009**       -0.0254       0.0481            1             
GOVT               0.0042           0.0021*          -0.0661          0.0061        -0.0225*      0.0233**     0.0902*   -0.083***    1
The results of the Pearson correlation of the variables are presented in Table 2. From
the result, there is evidence that significant relationship exists among the variables.
Our results further shows that negative relationship exist between AEM and REM,
and that a positive relationship exists between REM and Corporate governance vari-
ables. Our result implies that substitutional effect exit between AEM and REM.
Table 3 presents the results of the Two Stage Least Square (2SLS), from the result it
can be deduced that a direct relationship exists between insider ownership and earn-
ings management. The result implies that insiders’ ownership may restrict the rise of
discretionary accrual only when a percentage of shares held by board /management
is small. When compared with previous studies, our results is similar to the findings
of Machuga and Teitel (2009) for some selected Mexican firms, Morck et al. (1988)
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for some Canadian firms and Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia–Meca (2007) for some
Spanish firms, but contradicts Yeo et al. (2002) finding for Singapore.
Our result on the linkage between ownership concentration and earnings manage-
ment reveals that ownership concentration may constrain earnings management
when the proportion of share held by insiders is small. It further reveal that with large
share for insiders, evidence abound to show that firms tends to adopts earnings man-
agement. This result is also similar to that of the relationship between firm size and
earnings management but differs for the relationship between institutional investors
and earnings management. On this, our result is in line with the findings of Yeo et al
(2002) but contradicts De Bos and Donler (2004).
The result on board independence shows that no significant relationship exists be-
tween board independence and earnings management as large board weakens effec-
tiveness. If further reveals that chances are that external directors may not have access
to the firm’s financial books. The result on the relationship between earnings man-
agement and auditors’ independence shows that no significant relationship exists be-
tween the two.
On the relationship between board activities and earnings management our results
show that a negative relationship exist between the two in Nigeria. In a related de-
velopment, result on the connection between Government effectiveness and earn-
ings management shows negative sign. This implies that effective regulation deter
earnings management practice in Nigeria.
l Table 3. Results of the 2SLS estimates with EM as the dependent variable
Independent variables                                             Coefficients                                       T-test
INSOWN                                                                       0.451                                        2.178**
FARMOWN                                                                    0.116                                        1.487**
INSTINV                                                                      0.314                                         3.621*
BIND                                                                            -0.329                                         3.247
AUDIND                                                                                0.412                                          1.247
FSize                                                                            -0.3041                                     4.182***
GOVT                                                                           -0.413                                      3.412***
Growth                                                                         0.365                                         1.0121
R-Square                                                                  78.71
Adjusted R-Square                                                 76.93
F-Statistics                                                           18.648***
Endogeneity test Hausman test                           1.877
SOURCE: AUTHORS COMPUTATION 2017
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n 6. Conclusion and policy implications
This study examined the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms
and earnings management in Nigeria based on data sourced from firm listed on
the Nigeria stock exchange. Financial institutions are excluded from our study be-
cause of the peculiar nature of their financial reporting. The study employed a two
stage least square (2SLS) estimation techniques to examined the relationship
among the constructs and observed that direct relationship exist between insider
ownership and earnings management. It also reveals that Board independence neg-
atively affects earning management in Nigeria and that a negative relationship exists
between board activities and earning management. The result further show that
government policies negatively impact on earnings management.
The results above have great policy implications. First, given that ownership con-
centration, Board activities and government effectiveness negatively affect earning
management. Policy makers should ensure that these variables are encouraged and
strengthened. Effort should be made that will facilitate strict adherence to measures
that will trim down earnings management. 
Second, our results reveal that Board independence and auditor independence has
little or no effect on earnings management. This call for a need to strengthen the in-
ternal audit mechanism, thus, policy makers should put in place policies that will en-
courage internal audit system rather than emphasis on external audit independence.  
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